Encryption device, encryption method, decryption device, and decryption method by Isobe, Takanori & Bogdanov, Andrey
 
 
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright 
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
 Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
 You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
 You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal 
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
  
 
   
 
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Mar 29, 2019
Encryption device, encryption method, decryption device, and decryption method
Isobe, Takanori; Bogdanov, Andrey
Publication date:
2017
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Isobe, T., & Bogdanov, A. (2017). IPC No. G09C1/00; H04L9/00; H04L9/06. Encryption device, encryption
method, decryption device, and decryption method (Patent No. US2017294148 .)
THE LAST TA ETA ANTON A LA PRIMALO MANTAN US 20170294148A1 
( 19 ) United States ( 12 ) Patent Application Publication ( 10 ) Pub . No . : US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
ISOBE et al . ( 43 ) Pub . Date : Oct . 12 , 2017 
( 54 ) ENCRYPTION DEVICE , ENCRYPTION 
METHOD , DECRYPTION DEVICE , AND 
DECRYPTION METHOD 
( 71 ) Applicants : Sony Corporation , Tokyo ( JP ) ; 
Technical University of Denmark , 
Kgs . Lyngby ( DK ) 
( 72 ) Inventors : Takanori ISOBE , Tokyo ( JP ) ; Andrey 
BOGDANOV , Kongens Lyngby ( DK ) 
( 73 ) Assignees : Sony Corporation , Tokyo ( JP ) ; 
Technical University of Denmark , 
Kgs . Lyngby ( DK ) 
Publication Classification 
( 51 ) Int . CI . 
G09C 1 / 00 ( 2006 . 01 ) 
H04L 9 / 00 ( 2006 . 01 ) 
H04L 9 / 06 ( 2006 . 01 ) 
( 52 ) U . S . CI . 
CPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G09C 1 / 00 ( 2013 . 01 ) ; H04L 9 / 0631 ( 2013 . 01 ) ; H04L 9 / 002 ( 2013 . 01 ) ; H04L 
2209 / 16 ( 2013 . 01 ) 
( 57 ) ABSTRACT 
There is provided an encryption device including a data 
encryption unit configured to conduct encryption on the 
basis of a white box model in which at least a part of a 
plurality of round functions for sequentially conducting 
encryption processing on an input value is tabulated , and 
input and output values of the round function are recogniz 
able from an outside . The plurality of round functions each 
have an encryption function that is tabulated and encrypts an 
input value in a black box model in which input and output 
values are recognizable from the outside and an intermediate 
value is not recognizable from the outside . 
( 21 ) Appl . No . : 15 / 255 , 693 
( 22 ) Filed : Sep . 2 , 2016 
( 30 ) Foreign Application Priority Data 
Apr . 8 , 2016 ( JP ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2016 - 078386 
mwen 
som same nam www 
* more won whether Monsters are we were show ten wrote w 
with cures morate www . moms were menon www e W an 
come to our own mense where most recent saw one motoren nowo wow some more mone con nosotros como 
phone who - w SEVENTH 
" n / d BITS OF Xi FIRST 
nd BITS d - TH n / d BITS OF XA n / d BITS OF Xi 
FIRST S SECOND S 
FUNCTION FUNCTION 
THIRD S 
FUNCTION 
SS S . . . . . 
L 
FIRST 
n / d BITS 
OF Xi + 1 
d - TH 
n / d BITS 
OF Xi + 1 
arvos o menos como litt jill oll Ill til the matter 1 
and 
Xity 
FIRST S FUNCTION ( n / d bits to n - n / d bits ) 
SECOND S FUNCTION ( 2n / d bits to n - 2n / d bits ) 
THIRD S FUNCTION ( 4n / d bits to n - 4n / d bits ) 
FIG .1
Patent Application Publication 
PLAINTEXT 
EAVES DROPPER 
CONFIDENTIALITY IS PRESERVED
CIPHERTEXT 
Xn bits
n bits
k bitsCIPHER FUNCTION 
SECRET KEYongsberg
k bits
DECRYPTION FUNCTION D )
Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 1 of 30 
COMMUNICATION CHANNEL 
SECRET KEY
X nbits
X nbits
CIPHERTEXTC 
PLAINTEXT 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG .2
PLAINTEXT 
Patent Application Publication 
RK 
FIRST ROUND
RKY 
SECOND ROUN
Ø 
200 
100 EXPANDEDKEYK
( BITLENG H:k')
RK 
RK3 
THIRD ROUN
KEY SCHE 
K cene
DULE 
( BITLENG H:k)UN  
DATA 
ENCRYPTION .COM
UNIT 
REPEAT R TIMES
Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 2 of 30 
- 2
RKR -2mm
R -2THOUND
* 
* Xpert 
RKR 
Romy mu u
R -1THOUND
RKO -
R -THOUND
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
CIPHERTEXTC 
FIG .3
Patent Application Publication 
i -THROUND
m oi 
war trois 
RK ,mbonOUNDFUNCTION
* w
HIGH n/2B TSOFX;
LOW n/2BITSOFXi
RK ,-www.to
ROUND FUNCTION
RK 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * 
modern 
* # 
F UNCTION
wwwtwin te 
RK www
ROUND FUNCTION
# 
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww 
KAYYYYYAAYYYAAYYYAAAYYYYAAYYAAAYYYAAYYvonny 
Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 3 of 30 
* * * * * * * # # 1 
- 
. 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Y 
Y 
V 
. 
. 
RKg -
ROUND FUNCTIONmoviment 
HIGH n/2B TSOFXi+1
LOW n/2BITSOFXi+1
search remes ant s 
website content contra incent 
that a 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
some more was annos Aires w ond mae won www him n 
Xitt 
Xp +1
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
try o
f 
u 
n4A4444444444 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- .
. 
. 
. 
vvvvvvvv 
ROUND FUNCTION
RKR 
LINEAR TRANSFORMATION
FUNCTION 
* 
ANAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
* 
# 
# 
# 
# 
# 
# 
# 
AVAA VYUHAAYYYYAAAYYYAAAYYAAAYYYAAYYYYYYYYAANVYYAANVAATV . 
Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 4 of 30 
FUN &TOW]|U XUNSTON
OF X;
n /dBITS
ROUND FUNCTION
RK -
OF Xi
n /dBITSTHIRD 
OF XÍ
n /dBITSSECOND 
OF X
n /dBITSFIRST 
17 
HI -P
w 
me 
t 
wo 
shume me when we 
www car 
w m
s named the resten av en mense warning ceremonie 
om per a 
with anime o  b seenterede som eannan sema g minsa  
mense termine aman unwants m ss ma  
Y EXCLUSIVE-ORUNIT
hmmm . . . 
ROUND FUNCTION
RKZ -
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ROUND FUNCTION
AK 
Patent Application Publication 
FIG .4
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww 
w momanAndaSECURELY RETAIN 
ATTACKER CIPHER BLOCK por . . . 1 ww www wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwthe hole
. 
- 
- w
ww Www w
??? ????? ?? ??? . ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ??? ?? ??? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ?? ?? ??? ??? ?? ?? ?? ??? ???? ???? ??? ?? ??? 
FIG . 5 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 5 of 30 Patent Application Publication 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 6 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 6 
K menanyone BLOCK CIPHER ATTACKER 
FIG .7
Patent Application Publication 
BLOCK CIPHERE
300 mlTable
Table 
300 
300 
Table wwwwwwwwww 
Table 
key www
BLOCK CIPHERE 
Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 7 of 30 
- 300
Table 
{ able
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 8 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 8 
OVERALL 
CONFIGURATION 
TYPE OF 
FFUNCTION / S FUNCTION POSSIBILITY OF CHANGE IN Table size 
Feistel SINGLE No CONFIGURATION B 
CONFIGURATION SPN SINGLE YUMUAMMOLY No C Feiste MULTIPLE Yes Yes CONFIGURATION D 
CONFIGURATION 
E SPN MULTIPLE Yes 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 9 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 9 
BLOCK CIPHER ALGORITHM E ' , 
WHICH IS SECURE IN 
BLACK BOX 
CIPHER TYPE 
( Feistel or SPN ) INPUT : SECRET KEY K 
* 
MAKE KEY K DEPENDENT ON E ' , 
AND GENERATE KEYED FUNCTION E ' k $ 10 * 
S12 
Feistel * CIPHER TYPE mamma 
W S14 w wiiiiiii GENERATE F FI 
FROM EK GENERATE S FUNCTION FROM EK 
VS16 S22 
TABULATE F FUNCTION TABULATES FUNCTION 
CONNECT TABLE IN Feistel 
CONFIGURATION , AND 
GENERATE CIPHER FUNCTION E 
S24 
CONNECT TABLE IN SPN 
CONFIGURATION , AND 
GENERATE CIPHER FUNCTION E 
GENERATE CODE FROM FUNCTION BASED ON TABLE 
- 526 
www LLUIKELILLA 
OUTPUT : WHITE BOX ENCRYPTION CODE 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 10 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 10 
we 
course what 
w e w * th li W listopad IN * til ! w ww 
. 
www . www We are now wat w 
. FIRST 
n / d BITS OF Xí n / d BITS OF Xi 
C + 1 - TH 
n / d BITS OF Xi d - TH n / d BITS OF Xi 
HY Y Y . . . . . YY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 + * wwwww ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ? 
- LVULL -ALAHVOU
- 
- 
- 
LE 
wwwwwww FIRST 
F FUNCTION 
- A
VVVVAnnanvYYYLAAAAVE -LA Wwwwww 4444444UVELILI -PAPYLES
AAAA .-vVYY A A
I . * Awwwwwwwwww AANA W vrh Ww wv Y Av vyvvv 4 a vut Love 
FIRST 
n / d BITS OF Xi + 1 
d - TH 
n / d BITS OF Xi + 1 
www * ww www com 
the month wh * ili i www come mover one www We w e 
n we have a www Am ww . w more 
White 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 11 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 11 
: cx n / d - bit INPUT 
fanne www www ww www ang E FUNCTION 
- 
- 
- 
- n ' - ( cx nid ) ICX / d 
* 
* 
* 
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww 
* 
W 
w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
w w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
n ' - ( c * n / d ) cXnd 
w 
4 disregard 
+ 
nemen wanneer mennes maman anname mamans anomen anne og manna 
ROUND CONSTANT ( e . g . COUNTER ) 
V : n ? - ( cx n / d ) - bit INPUT 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 12 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 12 
* 
* 
* 
. 
we w wie In voor web Ithod Ili Ily - ly - were we w
FIRST 
8 BITS OF X SECOND 8 BITS OF Xi 
16TH 8 BITS OF Xi 
C . - - - • . - - - - - . . : : - * * * - - - - * - . . - - . - * * - - - * * * * * - - Linia m vás . * * - - - F i * * * * 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
BB DDDDD 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• FIRST 
F FUNCTION 
• 
v •
v 
v 
v 
ý 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
A VYVAAvvwW.VvYYYYAALJuvVU A AD2WvS4*222
4444444 • • 
• 
• 
4444 • 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
= 
= 
= 
= 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
v u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - 
- + _ - 
FIRST 
8 BITS OF Xi + 1 
SECOND 8 BITS OF Xi + 1 
16TH 
8 BITS OF Xi + 1 
w till w i111 til tume * * 
ww . in 
* 
w 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
www s
w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
www mm
wa 
watoto 
wa 
watu X 8 
disregard 
Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 13 of 30 
www www ww ww www www mw fumme mami 
C = 0 
FIG . 13 
120 X 120 
Patent Application Publication 
www www www www ww . wum 
E FUNCTION 
11 
bon 
mom 
n 
mom 
n 
- ~
A 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
W 
wwe noweco
w 
w 
w 
co 
w 
w 
ww wwmend
w 
w 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 14 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 14 
w 
w w w 
w w It }til w 
w IN - romper moment en com men det som ww w 
FIRST 
16 BITS OF Xi 
SECOND 
16 BITS OF Xi EIGHTH 16 BITS OF Xi 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Ai + + ASSYYYYY 
V 
" 1+
+ -
WANA +
De Be De Der FIRST F FUNCTION 
LAARZIVULLAA .vvvvAAAAA_VVVV LAANyty AA.
V 
AAA 
AAAAA 
- 
- AAAAVY A A A
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
vvvv - 44YYYYYY VAL . 4 4 * * . . NN - . - R . . . . . * - . . * * + + 
FIRST 
16 BITS OF Xi + 1 
SECOND 
16 BITS OF Xi + 1 
EIGHTH 
16 BITS OF Xi + 1 
* * come one was want weet 111 i I 111 u 
Mit 
Xunta 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 15 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 15 
me or morem come me e 
FIRST 
32 BITS OF Xi 
SECONDO 
32 BITS OF Xi EIGHTH 32 BITS OF Xi 
YYYYY 
- A A A A + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + . AL - Y AAAAA . vu MAUNAWAAAAAAAAAA 
- +
- 
- 
SARIYYYYTSARAFYYYY41SAATTY -inn.
- FIRST 
F FUNCTION od - 
YY "
A 
W 
AA .
Yennnn .
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
- .
. 
. 
- 
. 
Y -4946
- .+
- 
+ 
YAAAYYY AAAAYYYAAAAYYYYYYYAAYAWEYYYYAAAYYYAAALAYYYYYYYWA hamn 
FIRST 
16 BITS OF Xi + 1 
SECOND 
32 BITS OF Xi + 1 
FOURTH 
32 BITS OF Xi + 1 
{ * X 
* 
11 
wat moontlike one than women want dates www mwan 
Il Il whom ter were tw w 
me to the E he main os seus me man w eminen on 
8 BITS OF Xi + 1 
16TH 
8 BITS OF Xi + 1 FIRST 
? ? ?? ?? ??? . - ASININ YAA . . + VYYYWW . LAA - MYYYY ANSYVYYY - A . . . VVVVARA . . . - - IVA . VV . AALISYY 
YY44 -FPT71FFFF TTT 
V111111 *
ARY T
YA -VYNVWAAWAWAAAAAAAAA AAAYY.F FUNCTION 
FIRST RAFF .VVVV
. VNYARRA
. , . . - Y - A SSY AASSSSS S SSSY - SAMSONIYIZ . . . ASAULYYYYAAAAAASSAAASSS . . . 
8 BITS OF Xi 
16TH 
. 8 BITS OF X FOURTH n8 BITS OF Xi . 8 BITS OF Xi THIRD . ISIA 
mm by momen mest 
ww commelhorvan werkt word wees wat Il 
porno mestohet team 
were noted town woment moet mensen www w 
FIG . 16 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 16 of 30 Patent Application Publication 
Xj + + 
will 
you 
the man who 
www 
will want me pod we were some other woman www vow 
to the www when water town - 
32 BITS OF Xi + 1 
FOURTH 32 BITS OF Xi + 1 THIRD 32 BITS OF Xi + 1 SECOND n32 BITS OF Xi + 1 
FIRST 
YU . Y uY - = . ISSU - - - . . . . . . YYYYYY - . . - vVOU = = = . . • • • • • s t u v • • • • • • • • • • H E - - - - - - - - • • • • • • • • • 
- YYYYSAN
- YYYYYS
. YYYYY-_V SIIS
YYYYAAAYYYYYAAAYYYYAAAYYYAAAAAAYYYAAAYYY -Ladi. - 
F FUNCTION 
SECOND 
F FUNCTION 
FIRST 
- 
- .2222YJ
- 
- - - 
- - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - < - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . - - 
32 BITS OF Xi FOURTH 32 BITS OF Xi 
THIRD 
32 BITS OF XI 
SECOND everyone X = O SIIN TE ISIA opon w when we the ser man * w - * 
som 
www am mai 
FIG . 17 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 17 of 30 Patent Application Publication 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 18 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 18 
cannone out como co 
nsecuenos import mer moito 
more comes white word mom women were more wound women sajna moglie e non sono come mais neren 
an amous www mas como 
online wow 
FIRST 
n / d BITS 
OF Xi 
SECOND 
n / d BITS 
OF Xi 
d - TH 
n / d BITS 
OF Xi 
S FUNCTION 
SS + + + + + 4 SS 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
L 
FIRST 
n / d BITS 
d - TH 
n / d BITS 
OF Xi + 1 OF Xi + 1 
lllll lll Til till oll 
Yi + 1 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 19 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 19 
X : n / d - bit INPUT 
- 
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww w w w who co w w w w mom hora 
nd 
wwwwwwwwwwwwwww m
met 
mm wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww 
on womenannea
on A
Morten 
n / d 
w 
Lowo own wwwww mm www www www www www www www www 
: n / d - bit INPUT 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 20 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 20 
with www www won was nota come more words 
offee we were so come 
FIRST 
16 BITS 
OF Xi 
SECOND 
16 BITS 
OF Xi 
EIGHTH 
16 BITS 
OF Xi 
S FUNCTION SSSSSSSS 
FIRST 
16 BITS 
OF Xi + 1 
EIGHTH 
16 BITS 
OF Xi + 1 
} 
ww ww ww www www 
Love move was most w di om met sow man come una nowe m neman www 
he non son om www www promet c 
Xx + 3 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 21 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 21 
e we tum there want 
t het om 
pare 
u 
www Wort 
FIRST 
n / d BITS OF Xi 
FOURTH 
n / d BITS OF Xi 
d - TH 
n / d BITS 
OF Xi 
HQ 
" 
Ho 
Hoof 
w www 
SULENTIN 
WWW YWWWWWW 
FIRST 
n / d BITS OF Xi + 1 FOURTH n / d BITS OF Xi + 1 d - TH . n / d BITS OF Xi + 1 
FIRST F FUNCTION ( n / d - bit INPUT , n - n / d - bit OUTPUT ) 
SECOND F FUNCTION ( 2n / d - bit INPUT , n - 2n / d - bit OUTPUT ) 
THIRD F FUNCTION ( 3n / d - bit INPUT , n - 3n / d - bit OUTPUT ) 
FOURTH F FUNCTION ( 4n / d - bit INPUT , n - 4n / d - bit OUTPUT ) 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 22 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 22 
immer ww Wat om 
w * W 
we role wie wir 
will SEVENTHOSE X in www www me SEVENTH n / d BITS OF Xi w FIRST 
n / d BITS 
OF Xi 
FIRSTS SECONDS 
FUNCTION FUNCTION 
d - TH 
n / d BITS 
OF Xi 
THIRD S 
FUNCTION 
SI 
FIRST 
n / d BITS 
d - TH 
n / d BITS 
OF Xi + 1 OF Xi + 1 
totes with top more on so mo } !11111 11 li Il I !till Il il 
with water 
Xits 
FIRST S FUNCTION ( n / d bits to n - n / d bits ) 
SECOND S FUNCTION ( 2n / d bits to n - 2n / d bits ) 
THIRD S FUNCTION ( 4n / d bits to n - 4n / d bits ) 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 23 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 23 
Table 
* * * * * * * * . * W - * * * * 
w 
w 
w 
w belangen w w 1 - Min 
w w 
w 
w 
w 
w 
w AES ATTACKER w 
w w 
w 
w 
w 
* 
11 . Pisa w 1 ow 
. 
disregard 
- - - - - 
* 
- - - - 
- 
L 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
w w 
T /4=230MBI
Jex .SPACE-16,
w w w 
?? ?? ?? ?? ?????? 
. 
. 
. 
WWW .AVIYAVIYAV
Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 24 of 30 
ww www w 
D1 
1 
92107 .127
m m 
ATTACKER 
FOR DECIPHERMENTACQUIRE INFORMATIONIT SDIFFICULTTO
m 
XV .0
m 
. 
m 
DIFFICULT ILLEGAL DE IVERYS
m 
mom mom 
INSWNOJIANS NOI3X3
14 
. 
1 
2 
Lue m 
po 
* 
- 
- wwww
www www wwwwww wwwwww wwwwww
Patent Application Publication 
FIG .24
FIG .25
Patent Application Publication 
400 
410 
CONTENT SERVER(LOUDMPUTING)
USER DEVICE(e.gPC)
Media playerapplication
P :REMIUMCONTENT (MOVIE)
Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 25 of 30 
CONTENT DELIVERY 
C 
DECRYPTION 
p w
ww .baENCRYPTION
www youca
KEY 
KEYK 
WHITE BOXTECHNOLOGY
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG .26
400 
CONTENT PROVIDER(eg,NetflixiTunes)
410 
MOBILE ,PCEDIALAYER
Patent Application Publication 
412 
* * * * 
CONTENT (e.gM VIE,US C)
LICENSE 
LICENSE VERIFIER 
WHITE BOX
KEY wwwyoutENCRYPTION 
FUNCTION 
ENCRYPTED CONTENT
HOK 
ENCRYPTED CONTENT LICENSE 
Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 26 of 30 
ENCRYPTED CONTENT
WHITE BOX DECRYPTION FUNCTION 
M 
MINTIN 
402 
* * * * * * * 
* * * 
CONTENT (0.gMOVIE,US C)
* 
LICENSE GENERATOR 
* * 
LICENSE 
* * * * * * * 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww 
FIG .27
Patent Application Publication 
430 
Secure Element
Host CardEmulation
* 
* 
Host CPU
432 
Host CPU
432 
434 
436 
434 +
436 * * 
NFC Controller 
Secure Element 
NFC Controller 
Secure Element 
* 
Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 27 of 30 
: 
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwy 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
NFC Reader1420
NFC Reader
420 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG .28
440 
SYSTEM BA EDONCLOUOMPUTING
{ ssur
Patent Application Publication 
Credential informat on
Payment infor ation
ENCRYPTED 
WHITE BOX ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION 
Credential informat on
Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 28 of 30 
- 
Host CardEmulation
ENCRYPTED 
432 
430 
Payment rocessor
Credential information 
Host 
p }
WHITE BOXENCRYPTION )DECRYPTION FUNCTION 
NFC READER
WHITE BOX ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION 
MOBILE (NFC)
NFC Controller
420 
- 434
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 29 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 29 
445 
e com www com com www www www moon we com w ww mom mom hom www comme 
send out a bounded amount of info . 
T : CODE SIZE Adversary 
ww mmwwv4 T / 4 
4 : : : : www www mm 
Patent Application Publication Oct . 12 , 2017 Sheet 30 of 30 US 2017 / 0294148 A1 
FIG . 30 
SIDE - CHANNEL ATTACK 
{ eakage 
450 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 Oct . 12 , 2017 
ENCRYPTION DEVICE , ENCRYPTION 
METHOD , DECRYPTION DEVICE , AND 
DECRYPTION METHOD 
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATIONS 
[ 0001 ] This application claims the benefit of Japanese 
Priority Patent Application JP 2016 - 078386 filed Apr . 8 , 
2016 , the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by 
reference . 
BACKGROUND 
[ 0002 ] The present disclosure relates to an encryption 
device , an encryption method , a decryption device , and a 
decryption method . 
10003 ] As the related art , for example , S . Chow , P . Eisen , 
H . Johnson , P . C . van Oorschot “ A white - box DES imple 
mentation for DRM applications . ” DRM 2002 and S . Chow , 
P . Eisen , H . Johnson , P . C . van Oorschot “ White - Box 
Cryptography and an AES Implementation ? ” SAC 2002 
each describe a method for securely transforming the exist - 
ing block ciphers even in the white - box model . The methods 
described in S . Chow , P . Eisen , H . Johnson , P . C . van 
Oorschot “ A white - box DES implementation for DRM 
applications . ” DRM 2002 and S . Chow , P . Eisen , H . John 
son , P . C . van Oorschot “ White - Box Cryptography and an 
AES Implementation ? ” SAC 2002 relate to the white - box 
implementation of the existing algorithms ( DES and AES ) , 
and the technique of transforming an operation into a lookup 
table having a large size and embedding a secret key into the 
table to ensure the security of the internal operation visible 
to the outside . 
[ 0004 ] According to the methods described in S . Chow , P . 
Eisen , H . Johnson , P . C . van Oorschot “ A white - box DES implementation for DRM applications . ” DRM 2002 and S . 
Chow , P . Eisen , H . Johnson , P . C . van Oorschot “ White - Box 
Cryptography and an AES Implementation ? ” SAC 2002 , the 
value of a secret key is included in a table , and then a keyed 
table is generated . In order to enhance the security of each 
table , a secret non - linear function is added before and after 
the table . Meanwhile , the function IN and the function OUT 
are added before and after the encryption algorithm E as 
External Encoding . 
[ 0005 ] A . Biryukov , C . Bouillaguet , D . Khovratovich : 
“ Cryptographic Schemes Based on the SAAS Structure : 
Black - Box , White - Box , and Public - Key ” , ASIACRYPT 
2014 describes a method for configuring a table for a 
problem expected to be difficult to decompose , and config 
uring a block cipher , which is also secure in the white - box 
model . Specifically , the method described in A . Biryukov , C . 
Bouillaguet , D . Khovratovich : “ Cryptographic Schemes 
Based on the ASASA Structure : Black - Box , White - Box , and 
Public - Key ” , ASIACRYPT 2014 configures a table for a 
white - box by overlaying a secret non - linear function ( S 
layer ) and a secret linear function ( A layer ) , and more 
specifically , configures a table for a white - box by overlaying 
a three - layered secret linear function ( A layer ) and a two 
layered secret non - linear function ( S layer ) . 
DRM 2002 and S . Chow , P . Eisen , H . Johnson , P . C . van 
Oorschot “ White - Box Cryptography and an AES Implemen 
tation ? ” SAC 2002 to add a new function to an input and 
output of the encryption function E as external encoding in 
order to enhance the security , and the security is unfortu 
nately diminished greatly without external encoding . This 
results in a function different from the original encryption 
function E . Furthermore , even if external encoding is added , 
a practical attack method has been proposed . 
[ 0007 ] More specifically , the technique described in S . 
Chow , P . Eisen , H . Johnson , P . C . van Oorschot “ A white 
box DES implementation for DRM applications . ” DRM 
2002 and S . Chow , P . Eisen , H . Johnson , P . C . van Oorschot 
“ White - Box Cryptography and an AES Implementation ? " 
SAC 2002 is a white - box technique based on AES and DES . 
However , when external encoding is used , encryption in the 
white - box model results in a different cipher algorithm . 
Accordingly , this is not pure AES white box implementa 
tion , but means that a different cipher algorithm is imple 
mented . Furthermore , when encoded plaintext is decoded , it 
is necessary to decode plaintext encoded in another secure 
domain in the same device into normal text . In other words , 
space that allows for secure operations is necessary in 
environments in which white - box implementation is neces 
sary , which is incompatible with the white - box model . 
Accordingly , applications are unfortunately limited . When 
external encoding is not used , it is not possible to partially 
use external encoding to the first round and the final round , 
which unfortunately diminishes the security greatly . Even if 
external encoding is added , a practical attack method has 
been proposed . 
[ 0008 ] The method described in A . Biryukov , C . Bouil 
laguet , D . Khovratovich : “ Cryptographic Schemes Based on 
the ASASA Structure : Black - Box , White - Box , and Public 
Key ” , ASIACRYPT 2014 is unfortunately incapable of 
qualitatively evaluating security , and a practical attack 
method has already been proposed . Although security can be 
enhanced by repeating functional processing more as a 
possible approach , studies on the method for configuring a 
function by overlaying a secret non - linear function ( S layer ) 
and a secret linear function ( A layer ) have such a short 
history that it is difficult to qualitatively evaluate security . 
[ 0009 ] It is then desirable to ensure the confidentiality of 
a secret key and to securely conduct an encryption operation 
in the white - box model . [ 0010 ] According to an embodiment of the present disclo 
sure , there is provided an encryption device including : a data 
encryption unit configured to conduct encryption on the 
basis of a white box model in which at least a part of a 
plurality of round functions for sequentially conducting 
encryption processing on an input value is tabulated , and 
input and output values of the round function are recogniz 
able from an outside . The plurality of round functions each 
have an encryption function that is tabulated and encrypts an 
input value in a black box model in which input and output 
values are recognizable from the outside and an intermediate 
value is not recognizable from the outside . 
[ 0011 ] According to another embodiment of the present 
disclosure , there is provided an encryption method includ 
ing : conducting encryption on the basis of a white box model 
in which at least a part of a plurality of round functions for 
sequentially conducting encryption processing on an input 
value is tabulated , and input and output values of the round 
function are recognizable from an outside . The plurality of 
SUMMARY 
[ 0006 ] However , it is necessary in the methods described 
in S . Chow , P . Eisen , H . Johnson , P . C . van Oorschot “ A 
white - box DES implementation for DRM applications . ” 
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round functions each encrypt an input value on the basis of 
an encryption function that is tabulated in a black box model 
in which input and output values are recognizable from the 
outside and an intermediate value is not recognizable from 
the outside . [ 0012 ] According to still another embodiment of the pres 
ent disclosure , there is provided a decryption device includ 
ing : a data decryption unit configured to conduct decryption 
by an inverse operation of encryption processing of con 
ducting encryption on the basis of a white box model in 
which at least a part of a plurality of round functions for 
sequentially conducting encryption processing on an input 
value is tabulated , and input and output values of the round 
function are recognizable from an outside . The plurality of 
round functions each encrypt an input value on the basis of 
an encryption function that is tabulated in a black box model 
in which input and output values are recognizable from the 
outside and an intermediate value is not recognizable from 
the outside . [ 0013 ] According to yet another embodiment of the pres 
ent disclosure , there is provided a decryption method includ 
ing : conducting decryption by an inverse operation of 
encryption processing of conducting encryption on the basis 
of a white box model in which at least a part of a plurality 
of round functions for sequentially conducting encryption 
processing on an input value is tabulated , and input and 
output values of the round function are recognizable from an 
outside . The plurality of round functions each encrypt an 
input value on the basis of an encryption function that is 
tabulated in a black box model in which input and output 
values are recognizable from the outside and an intermediate 
value is not recognizable from the outside . 
[ 0014 ] According to one or more of embodiments of the 
present disclosure described above , it is possible to preserve 
the confidentiality of a key and to enhance the confidenti 
ality of data by conducting a secure encryption operation in 
the white box model . 
100151 Note that the effects described above are not nec 
essarily limited , and along with or instead of the effects , any 
effect that is desired to be introduced in the present speci 
fication or other effects that can be expected from the present 
specification may be exhibited . 
[ 0024 ] FIG . I is a flowchart illustrating processing accord 
ing to a cipher type ; 
f0025 ] FIG . 10 is a schematic diagram illustrating the 
specific example ( B ) ; 
[ 0026 ] FIG . 11 is a schematic diagram illustrating a con 
figuration of an F function ; 
100271 . FIG . 12 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
overall configuration for n = n = 128 , c = 1 , and d = 16 in FIG . 
10 ; 
[ 0028 ] FIG . 13 illustrates a configuration of an F function 
in an example of FIG . 12 ; 
10029 ] . FIG . 14 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
overall configuration for n = 128 , c = 1 , and d = 8 in FIG . 10 ; 
[ 0030 ] FIG . 15 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
overall configuration for n = 128 , c = 1 , and d = 4 in FIG . 10 ; 
( 0031 ) FIG . 16 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
overall configuration for n = 128 , c = 3 , and d = 16 in FIG . 10 ; 
100321 FIG . 17 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
example in which there are two F functions in a single round , 
and n is equal to 128 and d is equal to 4 ; 
[ 0033 ] FIG . 18 is a schematic diagram illustrating the 
specific example ( C ) ; 
00341 . FIG . 19 is a schematic diagram illustrating a con 
figuration of an S function illustrated in FIG . 18 ; 
[ 0035 ] FIG . 20 is a schematic diagram illustrating n = 128 
and d = 8 in FIG . 18 ; 
[ 0036 ] FIG . 21 is a schematic diagram illustrating the 
specific example ( D ) ; 
[ 0037 ] FIG . 22 is a schematic diagram illustrating the 
specific example ( E ) ; 
[ 0038 ] FIG . 23 is a schematic diagram for describing 
security achieved by encryption according to the present 
embodiment ; 
[ 00391 . FIG . 24 is a schematic diagram for describing 
security achieved by encryption according to the present 
embodiment ; 
[ 0040 ] FIG . 25 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
example applied to a copyright protection technique ( digital 
rights management ( DRM ) ) ; 
[ 0041 ] FIG . 26 is a schematic diagram illustrating FIG . 25 
in more detail ; [ 0042 ] FIG . 27 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
example applied to a payment system that uses NFC emu 
lation ; [ 0043 ] FIG . 28 is a schematic diagram illustrating FIG . 27 
in more detail ; 
[ 0044 ] FIG . 29 is a schematic diagram illustrating a 
scheme that is secure against even a memory leak ; and 
[ 0045 ] FIG . 30 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
example of encryption that is secure against a side - channel 
attack . 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
[ 0016 ] FIG . 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a com 
mon key block cipher ; 
[ 0017 ] FIG . 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating an inter 
nal configuration of a block ( cipher function E ) for encryp 
tion ; [ 0018 ] FIG . 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating a Feistel 
structure ; [ 0019 ] FIG . 4 is a schematic diagram illustrating an SPN 
structure ; [ 0020 ] FIG . 5 is a schematic diagram illustrating a black 
box model including a common key block cipher ; 
[ 0021 ] FIG . 6 is a schematic diagram illustrating a white 
box model including a common key block cipher ; [ 0022 ] FIG . 7 is a schematic diagram illustrating an over 
view of an encryption technique according to the present 
embodiment ; [ 0023 ] FIG . 8 is a schematic diagram illustrating an over 
all configuration , a type of F function / S function , and 
possibility of change in a table size for specific examples 
( B ) , ( C ) , ( D ) , and ( E ) ; 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE 
EMBODIMENT ( S ) 
[ 0046 ] Hereinafter , ( a ) preferred embodiment ( s ) of the 
present disclosure will be described in detail with reference 
to the appended drawings . In this specification and the 
appended drawings , structural elements that have substan 
tially the same function and structure are denoted with the 
same reference numerals , and repeated explanation of these 
structural elements is omitted . 
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[ 0047 ] A description will be now made in the following 
order . 
0048 ] 1 . Prerequisite Techniques 
[ 0049 ] 2 . Overview of the Present Embodiment [ 0050 ] 3 . Specific Configuration Examples 
[ 0051 ] 3 . 1 . Specific Example ( B ) [ 0052 ] 3 . 2 . Specific Example ( C ) 
[ 0053 ] 3 . 3 . Specific Example ( D ) [ 0054 ] 3 . 4 . Specific Example ( E ) [ 0055 ] 4 . Configuration Example for Decryption 
[ 0056 ] 5 . Differences from Related Art 
[ 0057 ] 5 . 1 . Difference from Related Art 1 
0058 ] 5 . 2 . Difference from Related Art 2 [ 0059 ] 6 . Security Achieved by Encryption according to 
the Present Embodiment [ 0060 ] 7 . Example of Application to which the Present 
Embodiment is Applied 
1 . Prerequisite Techniques 
[ 0061 ] The common key block cipher technique has been 
known , by which the same key is used for encryption and 
decryption . FIG . 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a 
common key block cipher , and illustrates an n - bit common 
key block cipher algorithm E corresponding to a key length 
of k bits . A secret key K of k bits is used to encrypt plaintext 
P ( n bits ) on the basis of a cipher function E and to generate 
ciphertext C ( n bits ) . The secret key K of k bits is used to 
decrypt the ciphertext C ( n bits ) on the basis of a decryption 
function D ( E - ? ) and to generate the plaintext P ( n bits ) . 
This common key block cipher can preserve the confiden 
tiality of plaintext from eavesdroppers ( who will also be 
referred to as attackers ) when data are transmitted to , for 
example , a communication channel as illustrated in FIG . 1 . 
[ 0062 ] The bit lengths of the plaintext P and the ciphertext 
Care each referred to as a block size , and represented herein 
as n . Any integer is possible as the value of n , and a single 
integer is decided in advance for each block cipher algo 
rithm in most cases . A block cipher having a block length of 
n will also be referred to as n - bit block cipher . The bit length 
of the secret key K is represented as k , and the bit length k 
of the key can have any integer value . Common key block 
cipher algorithms correspond to one or more key sizes . For 
example , a block cipher algorithm A has a block size of 
n = 128 , and can correspond to a key size of k = 128 , k = 192 , 
or k = 256 . [ 0063 ] A decryption algorithm D corresponding to the 
encryption algorithm E can be defined as an inverse function 
E - 1 of the encryption algorithm E , and receives the cipher 
text C and the key K as an input and outputs the plaintext P . 
[ 0064 ] FIG . 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating the 
internal configuration of a block ( cipher function E ) for 
encryption . The cipher function E includes a key schedule 
unit 100 and a data encryption unit 200 . The key schedule 
unit 100 uses the key K as an input , and outputs an expanded 
key K ' ( bit length k ' ) obtained by expanding the bit length 
through given steps . The data encryption unit 200 receives 
the plaintext P , receives the expanded key K ' from the key 
schedule unit 100 , transforms the data , and outputs the 
ciphertext C . The data encryption unit 200 repeatedly pro 
cesses round functions obtained from the expanded key K ' 
for encryption . 
[ 0065 ] The data encryption unit 200 can be divided into 
round functions serving as processing units . A round func 
tion receives two pieces of data as inputs , processes the data 
inside , and then outputs a piece of data . A piece of the input 
data is n - bit data that are being encrypted , and the output of 
the round function in a round is supplied as an input of the 
next round function . The other piece of the input data is 
partial data of the expanded key K ' output from the key 
schedule unit 100 , and the key data are referred to as round 
key . The total number of round functions is referred to as 
total number of rounds . The total number of rounds repre 
sents a value decided in advance for each cipher algorithm . 
Herein , the total number of rounds is represented as R . If the 
input data of the first round from the input side of the data 
encryption unit 200 are represented as X , and the data input 
to the i - th round function are represented as Xi and the round 
key is represented as RKi , the configuration of the data 
encryption unit 200 is as illustrated in FIG . 2 . 
[ 0066 ] Round functions can have a variety of structures in 
accordance with a block cipher algorithm . Round functions 
can be categorized in accordance with the structure adopted 
by the cipher algorithm . Herein , the SPN structure , the 
Feistel structure , and the extended Feistel structure are 
exemplified as the typical structures . 
[ 0067 ] FIG . 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating a Feistel 
structure . FIG . 4 is a schematic diagram illustrating an SPN 
structure . In the example of the basic configuration of the 
Feistel structure illustrated in FIG . 3 , input data X ; of n bits 
are divided into the high n / 2 bits and the low n / 2 bits in each 
round function , and the data of each line have a size of n / 2 
bits . The high n / 2 bits are input into the F function , and n / 2 
bits are output . These outputs are exclusive - ORed with the 
low n / 2 bits . Afterwards , the left and right of the data are 
exchanged to obtain output data X : - 1 . The F function is 
configured on the basis of a non - linear function . Different 
from the SPN structure , the F function does not have to be 
a permutation . Generally speaking , the F function is not 
generated from a block cipher , but a non - linear operation , 
which imposes a light computation load . However , the F 
function is generated from a block cipher in the present 
embodiment . 
10068 ] Although data are divided into two in the Feistel 
structure , data are extendedly divided into three or more in 
the extended Feistel structure ( generalized Feistel structure ) . 
If the number of data that are divided is represented as d , it 
is possible to define a variety of extended Feistel structures 
on the basis of the number d of divided data . The input and 
output sizes of an F function relatively decrease , and it is 
thus suitable for small implementation . Each round function 
can also have a plurality of F functions . 
[ 0069 ] FIG . 17 discussed below illustrates an example of 
the extended Feistel structure in which d is equal to 4 , and 
two F functions are applied to a single round in parallel . In 
this example , a first F function and a second F function 
respectively have RK1 , and RK2 , as key inputs . FIG . 14 
discussed below illustrates an example of the extended 
Feistel structure in which d is equal to 8 , and a single F 
function is applied to a single round in parallel . In this 
example , the F function has an input size of n / 8 bits , and the 
F function has an output size of 7n / 8 bits . The output is 
divided into seven pieces of n / 8 - bit data , and exclusive 
ORed with the remaining seven pieces of 16 - bit data . 
Additionally , n is equal to 128 bits . 
[ 0070 ] In the example of the basic configuration of the 
SPN structure illustrated in FIG . 4 , an operation of exclu 
sive - OR with a round key , a non - linear transformation 
operation , a linear transformation operation , and the like are 
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to as white box implementation . According to the white box implementation , it is also possible to configure a block 
cipher with software alone . 
10073 ] In this way , an attacker is capable of recognizing 
and freely controlling an input and output of a block cipher , 
and recognizing and freely controlling an intermediate value 
of the block cipher in the white box model . It has to be 
difficult in the white box model for an attacker to obtain the 
key K from the perspective of the amount of computation . 
The white box model also has to be resistant to an attack 
( referred to as code lifting ) where an attacker directly uses 
a code itself as a big key instead of obtaining the key K . The 
white box model , in which an attacker can recognize an 
intermediate value of a block cipher , has to be quantitatively 
secure against such attacks . 
2 . Overview of the Present Embodiment 
applied to all the input data of n bits . A non - linear transfor 
mation unit is referred to as substitution - layer ( S layer ) and 
a linear transformation unit is referred to as permutation 
layer ( P layer ) , each of which is a permutation ( bijective 
function ) . Each round function has the input data Xi of n bits 
divided into d pieces of data , and the data of each line have 
a size of n / d [ bits ) . Herein , a non - linear transformation 
operation is defined as an S function , and a non - linear 
transformation operation substitution - layer ( S layer ) having 
an input and output of n / d [ bits ] is executed for each of the 
data . Afterwards , a linear transformation L having an input 
and output of n bits is executed as a linear transformation 
permutation - layer ( P layer ) . Additionally , the linear trans 
formation operation is defined as an L function . 
[ 0071 ] There are a black box model and a white box model 
as security models of a block cipher . FIG . 5 is a schematic 
diagram illustrating a black box model including a common 
key block cipher . Although an attacker seeking for a secret 
key is capable of recognizing and freely controlling an input 
and output of a block cipher , the attacker is incapable of 
recognizing an intermediate value of the block cipher in the 
black box model . In other words , the black box model is a 
security model in which an attacker is capable of accessing 
only the plaintext P and the ciphertext C , which are respec 
tively an input and an output of a block cipher algorithm . 
Attacks carried out by an attacker can be categorized into a 
known plaintext and ciphertext attach where an attacker just 
knows the values of the pair of the plaintext P and the cipher 
text C , and a chosen plaintext and ciphertext attack where an 
attacker can additionally control the values in itself freely . 
The black box model presumes that a cipher operation in 
itself is securely executed , and an attacker is incapable of 
seeing or tampering an intermediate value of the cipher . The 
black box model is used , for example , when the tamper 
resistance of cipher operations is ensured by use of hardware 
support . A method for implementing a cipher algorithm for 
a black box is referred to as black box implementation . The 
black box model allows for a secure design where a secret 
key is hidden from an attacker . In the black box model , a 
block cipher is designed in a manner that it is difficult to 
obtain the secret key K because of the amount of compu 
tation ( key recovery attack resistance ) , and it is difficult to 
distinguish the block cipher from a pseudorandom keyed 
permutation because of the amount of computation ( distin 
guishing attack resistance ) . A block cipher , which is secure in the black box model , can be implemented by encryption 
techniques such as AES , CLEFIA , PRESENT , and Piccolo . 
[ 0072 ] FIG . 6 is a schematic diagram illustrating a white 
box model including a common key block cipher . The white 
box model is a security model against attackers stronger than 
those of the black box model , and an attacker can freely 
access not only the plaintext P serving as an input of a block 
cipher algorithm , and the ciphertext serving as an output of 
the block cipher algorithm , but also an intermediate value of 
an operation . The white box model presumes that an attacker 
can freely control the plaintext P serving as an input of a 
block cipher and the ciphertext C , and further see and tamper 
any intermediate value being operated . The white box model 
is used when tamper resistance is not ensured because of 
implementation constraints caused by all software ( no hard 
ware support ) . The white box model is also used when an 
intermediate value leaks because of implementation vulner 
ability such as a buffer overflow and malware . A method for 
implementing a cipher algorithm for a white box is referred 
[ 0074 ] The present embodiment proposes a technique of 
secure encryption and decryption , and a technique of pro 
tecting a secret key in an unreliable execution environment 
in the above - described white box model . As examples of the 
unreliable environment , it is not possible to securely keep a 
secret key , and an attacker can recognize an intermediate 
value of an encryption operation . 
[ 0075 ] FIG . 7 is a schematic diagram illustrating the 
overview of an encryption technique according to the pres 
ent embodiment , and illustrates an encryption device 
according to a basic configuration example ( A ) . A block 
cipher E includes a plurality of tables 300 , and each table is 
configured as a secure block cipher E ' ( internal block cipher ) 
in the black box model . This allows the secure block cipher 
E to be configured . A part or all of components including the 
block cipher E ' are tabulated and implemented in the white 
box implementation . A user can freely choose an algorithm 
of the block cipher E ' . Additionally , the encryption device 
can include a central processing unit such as a CPU , and a 
program for causing the central processing unit to function . 
In this case , the program can be stored in a recording 
medium such as memory installed on the encryption device . 
A table included in a block cipher can be stored in the 
recording medium installed on the encryption device . 
[ 0076 ] In this way , the block cipher E , which is secure in 
the white box model , is configured by using the block cipher 
E ' , which is secure in the black box model , as a component in the basic configuration example ( A ) of the present 
embodiment . A user can freely choose an algorithm of the 
internal block cipher E ' , and receive it as an input . In the 
white box implementation , functions based on the internal 
block cipher E ' are dependent on a key , and a part or all of 
the functions are implemented as a table . In other words , the 
internal block cipher E ' is generated and tabulated by the 
expanded key K ' output from the key schedule unit 100 . 
Tabulation can greatly enhance the confidentiality of the key 
as compared with each encryption operation . 
[ 0077 ] As a specific example ( B ) of the configuration 
example ( A ) , the block cipher E has a Feistel structure and 
includes an F function having a single type of input and 
output size , and the F function is generated on the basis of 
the internal block cipher E ' . The F function can be obtained 
as a transformation of the internal block cipher E ' by fixing 
a part of the input of the E ' and disregarding a part of the 
output of the E ' . All of the F functions are implemented as 
a table in the white box implementation . 
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[ 0078 ] As a specific example ( C ) of the configuration 
example ( A ) , the block cipher E has an SPN structure and 
includes an S function having a single input and output size , 
and the S function is generated on the basis of the internal 
block cipher E ' . The S function includes internal block 
ciphers having the same size . All of the S functions are 
implemented as a table in the white box implementation . 
[ 0079 ] As a specific example ( D ) of the configuration 
example ( A ) , the block cipher E has an extended Feistel 
structure and includes an F function having a multiple types 
of input and output size , and the F function is generated on 
the basis of the internal block cipher E ' . The F function can 
be generated by fixing a part of the input of the internal block 
cipher and disregarding a part of the output of the internal 
block cipher . A part or all of the F functions are implemented 
as a table in the white box implementation . 
[ 0080 ] As a specific example ( E ) of the configuration 
example ( A ) , the block cipher E has an SPN structure and 
includes an S function having multiple types of input and 
output size , and the S function is generated on the basis of 
the internal block cipher E ' . The S function includes internal 
block ciphers having the same size . A part or all of them are 
implemented as a table in the white box implementation . 
[ 0081 ] FIG . 8 is a schematic diagram illustrating an over 
all configuration , a type of F function / S function , and 
possibility of change in a table size for specific examples 
( B ) , ( C ) , ( D ) , and ( E ) . [ 0082 ] FIG . 9 is a flowchart illustrating processing accord 
ing to a cipher type . First , in step S10 of FIG . 9 , the key K 
is made dependent on the internal block cipher E ' to generate 
a keyed function E ' k . Next , in step S12 , a cipher type is 
determined , and if the cipher type is determined as a Feistel 
structure , the processing proceeds to step S14 . In step S14 , 
an F function is generated from E ' k . Next , in step S16 , the 
[ 0083 ] F function is tabulated . In step S18 , the table is 
connected in the Feistel configuration to generate a cipher 
function E . 
[ 0084 ] If the cipher type is determined as an SPN structure 
in step S12 , the processing proceeds to step S20 and an S 
function is generated from Ex . Next , in step S22 , the S 
function is tabulated . In step S24 , the table is connected in 
the SPN configuration to generate a cipher function E . The 
processing proceeds to step S26 after steps S18 and S24 , and 
a code is then generated from a function based on the table . 
This generates a white box encryption code . 
d - c pieces of n / d - [ bit ] data , and exclusive - ORed with each 
of the remaining d - c lines . The F function is configured on 
the basis of the internal block cipher E ' . It is herein consid 
ered that a block size n ' of E ' satisfies n > ( d - c ) x ( n / d ) and 
n ' > cx ( n / d ) ( condition 1 ) . As illustrated in FIG . 10 , the value 
of a bit input into the block cipher E ' is output as a lower bit 
than the value of a bit obtained on the basis of the exclusive 
OR . FIG . 11 is a schematic diagram illustrating a configu 
ration of an F function . [ 0088 ] The following is a method for configuring the F 
function with a cxn / d - [ bit ] input and a ( d - c ) x ( n / d ) - [ bit ] 
output on the basis of the internal block cipher E ' of n ' bits . 
First , as illustrated in FIG . 11 , given n ' - ( cxn / d ) [ bits ] among 
the input of n ' [ bits ] into the internal block cipher E ' are fixed 
as a constant value ( e . g . all 0 ) , and the input size is set as 
cxn / d . Next , the output size is set as n ' - ( cxn / d ) by disre 
garding given ( cxn / d ) [ bits ] of the output . In this way , a part 
of the input bits into the internal block cipher E ' is fixed , and 
a part of the output is disregarded , thereby configuring the 
F function on the basis of a given internal block cipher E ' 
satisfying the condition 1 . The F function is configured by 
tabulation on the basis of the table corresponding to an input 
and output of n ' bits . For example , when an input and output 
are 8 bits , a table is generated that associates the output value 
with the input value ( 0 to 255 ) . It is possible on this table to 
adjust the number of input and output bits such as an 8 - bit 
input and a 120 - bit output by fixing a part of the input bits 
and disregarding a part of the output . Herein , a round - unique 
constant is exclusive - ORed ( XORed ) with an output of 
n ' - ( cxn / d ) bits in order to change the F function in each 
round . For example , the round - unique constant is referred to 
as round number , and the round number is XORed . When 
the round number is 4 , 4 is XORed . However , this exclusive 
OR is operated after table lookup , and thus this operation 
itself is not included in the table . This makes it possible to 
express an F function that is different in each round by use 
of a single type of F function table . Accordingly , the F 
functions in the respective round functions can be config 
ured in common , and memory space for storing the table can 
be greatly reduced . 
10089 ] FIGS . 12 to 15 are schematic diagrams each illus 
trating a specific configuration example . FIG . 12 illustrates 
an overall configuration for n = n ' = 128 , c = 1 , and d = 16 . FIG . 
13 illustrates the configuration of the F function in the 
example of FIG . 12 . Meanwhile , FIG . 14 illustrates an 
overall configuration for n = 128 , c = 1 and d = 8 , FIG . 15 
illustrates an overall configuration for n = 128 , c = 1 and d = 4 , 
and FIG . 16 illustrates an overall configuration for n = 128 , 
c = 3 and d = 16 . 
[ 0090 ] FIG . 17 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
example in which there are two F functions in a single round , 
and n is equal to 128 and d is equal to 4 . In all the examples 
described above , an F function is implemented as a table in 
the white box implementation . In the examples of FIGS . 12 , 
14 , 15 , and 16 , the tables have sizes ( sizes of the F functions ) 
of approximately 3 . 84 [ bytes ] , 918 [ Kbytes ) , 51 . 5 [ Gbytes ) , 
and 218 [ Mbytes ) , respectively . 
3 . Specific Configuration Examples 
[ 0085 ] The following describes the configuration 
examples of the specific example ( B ) , the specific example 
( C ) , the specific example ( D ) and the specific example ( E ) , 
and advantageous effects thereof in detail . The internal block 
cipher E ' is an n ' - bit block cipher , and secure in the black box 
model . 
3 . 1 . Specific Example ( B ) 
[ 0086 ] FIG . 10 is a schematic diagram illustrating the 
specific example ( B ) , and illustrates a configuration example 
of the generalized Feistel structure . Input data 
[ 0087 ) Xi of n bits are divided into n pieces of data , and 
the data of each line have a size of n / d bits in the example 
illustrated in FIG . 10 . The F function has a cxn / d - bit input 
and a ( d - c ) x ( n / d ) ( = n - ( cxn / d ) ) - [ bit ] output . Data of c lines 
are input into the F function , while the output is divided into 
3 . 2 . Specific Example ( C ) 
[ 0091 ] FIG . 18 is a schematic diagram illustrating the 
specific example ( C ) , and illustrates a configuration example 
based on the SPN structure . Input data Xi of n bits are 
divided into n pieces of data , and the data of each line have 
a size of n / d fbits ) in the example illustrated in FIG . 18 . An 
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table sizes of approximately 3 . 84 [ bytes ] , 918 [ Kbytes ) , 218 [ Mbytes ) , and 51 . 5 [ Gbytes ) , respectively . It is possible to 
adjust the overall code size by choosing which F function is 
implemented as a table in accordance with a request of a 
user . For example , if the fourth round function is not 
tabulated , but a function operation is conducted each time , 
it is possible to reduce the overall code size . 
operation ( non - linear transformation operation substitution 
layer ( S layer ) ) of the S function having an input and output 
of n / d [ bits ] is executed on each of data . Afterwards , n - bit 
input and output linear transformation is executed as an 
operation of an L function ( linear transformation permuta 
tion - layer ( P layer ) ) . Herein , the S function and the L 
function ( input and output linear transformation L ) are 
bijective functions , and the L function includes a round 
constant operation . The S function is configured on the basis 
of the internal block cipher E ' , but the S function has to be 
a bijective function . As illustrated in FIG . 11 , it is not 
possible to configure the S function through transformation 
by fixing the input bits of the internal block cipher E ' , and 
disregarding a part of the outputs . Accordingly , a block 
cipher of n / d bits has to be used . Accordingly , the condition 
of the block size n ' of the internal block cipher E ' is n ' = n / d 
( condition 2 ) . 
100921 FIG . 19 is a schematic diagram illustrating a con 
figuration of an S function illustrated in FIG . 18 . As illus 
trated in FIG . 19 , the internal block cipher E ' included in an 
S function has both input and output sizes of n / d [ bits ] . 
Accordingly , for example , when an input and output are 8 
bits , a table is generated that associates the output value with 
the input value ( 0 to 255 ) , and an operation of the S function 
is conducted on the basis of the table . An L function for a 
linear transformation operation includes , for example , a 
square matrix . When the input and output of the S function 
are 8 bits , the output of 8 bits from the S function is input 
into the L function . The value of 8 bits is output from the L 
function by multiplying the value of 8 bits by a square 
matrix of 8x8 . In this way , the L function serves to diffuse 
the output value from the S function . 
[ 0093 ] FIG . 20 is a schematic diagram illustrating a spe 
cific configuration example for n = 128 , and d = 8 . An S 
function is implemented as a table in the white box imple 
mentation . The table of FIG . 20 has a size of approximately 
256 [ bytes ) . Similarly to the F function illustrated in FIG . 11 , 
a round - unique constant can be XORed with the output of 
each S function in order to change the S function . This leads 
to common S functions , and memory space for storing the 
table can be thus reduced greatly . 
3 . 4 . Specific Example ( E ) 
[ 0095 ] FIG . 22 is a schematic diagram illustrating the 
specific example ( E ) , and illustrates a configuration example 
based on the modified SPN structure . Input data of n bits are 
divided into d pieces of data , and the data of each line have 
a size of n / d in the example illustrated in FIG . 22 , and S 
functions of three types that have different sizes are 
included . As the S layer of each round , S functions having 
an input and output of n / d [ bits ) , an input and output of 2n / d 
[ bits ] , and an input and output of 4n / d [ bits ] are used . In the 
white box implementation , a part or all of them are imple 
mented as a table in accordance with a code ( table size ) 
requested by a user . For example , it is considered that n is 
equal to 128 and d is equal to 8 , and data of 8 [ bits ] , 16 [ bits ] 
and 32 bits ) are implemented . The respective tables have 
sizes of 256 [ bytes ) , 132 [ Kbytes ) , and 17 . 2 [ Gbytes ) . It is 
possible to adjust the overall code size by choosing which S 
function is implemented as a table in accordance with a 
request of a user . 
[ 0096 ] According to the present embodiment , the security 
of key extraction in the white box model results in the 
security of the key recovery problem in the black box model 
of the internal block cipher E ' . This results from the internal 
block cipher E ' implemented as a table in the white box 
implementation . An attacker can also access only an input 
and output of the table in the white model . This matches with 
the black box model of the internal block cipher E ' . It is 
possible to preserve the same security level as that of key 
recovery of the black box model of the internal block cipher 
E ' even in the white box model by applying a reliable cipher 
( such as AES ) to the internal state ( internal block cipher E ' ) . 
[ 0097 ] Unless an attacker knows the key , the attacker is incapable of reducing the table size ( Space - hardness ) . 
Unless an attacker knows information on the key of the 
internal block cipher E ' , the attacker is incapable of com 
puting E ' except for a table operation . Accordingly , it is not 
possible to reduce the size of the provided table into a 
smaller one . This means that an attacker has to use massive 
data to carry out a code lifting attack . The time necessary for 
code extraction increases in proportion to the data size . Code 
lifting then takes much time . Furthermore , even if the entire 
code is acquired , it is not possible to compress the size and 
massive data have to be transmitted to deliver the code . It is 
thus still possible to reduce the risk of delivery . 
[ 0098 ] As for external encoding , it is possible to ensure 
security even without External Encoding . 
[ 0099 ] It is further possible to configure tables having a 
variety of sizes according to implementation requests . 
According to the specific examples ( B ) and ( C ) , it is possible 
to configure an algorithm having a given table size by 
changing the value of the number d of divided data . Accord 
ing to the specific examples ( D ) and ( E ) , it is possible to 
implement a plurality of table sizes for the same algorithm 
by appropriately choosing the values of the number d of 
divided data or the sizes of an F function and an S function 
to be used . 
3 . 3 . Specific Example ( D ) 
[ 0094 ] FIG . 21 is a schematic diagram illustrating the 
specific example ( D ) , and illustrates a configuration example 
of the modified Feistel structure . Input data of n bits are 
divided into d pieces of data , and the data of each line have 
a size of n / d in the example illustrated in FIG . 21 , and F 
functions of four types that have different sizes are included . 
An F function having an n / d - [ bit ] input , and a ( n - n / d ) - [ bit ] 
output is used in the first round . An F function having a 
2n / d - [ bit ] input , and a ( n - 2n / d ) - [ bit ] output is used in the 
second round . An F function having a 3n / d - [ bit ] input , and 
a ( n - 3n / d ) - [ bit ] output is used in the third round . An F . 
function having a 4n / d - [ bit ] input , and a ( n - 4n / d ) - [ bit ] 
output is used in the fourth round . These four rounds serve 
as a unit , and the processing is repeated by given rounds . As 
in the method illustrated in FIG . 11 , an F function having a 
given size is generated from the internal block cipher E ' , and 
the round constant is XORed with the output . In the white 
box implementation , a part or all of them are implemented 
as a table in accordance with a code ( table size ) requested by 
a user . When n is equal to 128 and d is equal to 16 , the F 
functions of the first , second , third , and fourth rounds have 
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[ 0100 ] A user can freely choose an internal block cipher 
E ' . It is possible to freely choose an internal block cipher E ' 
as long as the internal block cipher E ' satisfies the conditions 
( conditions 1 and 2 ) of the input and output sizes . When used 
in a black box , a table does not have to be implemented , but 
an internal operation can be directly operated . In this case , 
it is possible to satisfy a variety of implementation needs by 
appropriately choosing an internal block cipher E ' . For 
example , when AES is used as an internal block cipher E ' 
and AES - NI is used , very speedy implementation by soft 
ware is possible and secure implementation against a cash 
timing attack is possible . The use of light ciphers Piccolo 
and Pride by software makes implementation possible even 
in environments of considerable constraints such as a RAM 
size . 
4 . Configuration Example for Decryption 
[ 0101 ] As discussed above , the decryption algorithm D 
corresponding to the encryption algorithm E can be defined 
as an inverse function E - ? of the encryption algorithm E , and 
receives the ciphertext C and the key K as an input and 
outputs the plaintext P . As for the decryption algorithm D , it 
is possible to preserve the same security level as that of the 
black box model by configuring a table in the black box implementation . 
5 . Differences from Related Art 
( 0102 ] The following describes differences between the 
technique according to the present embodiment , and the 
methods ( referred to as Related Art 1 ) described in S . Chow , 
P . Eisen , H . Johnson , P . C . van Oorschot “ A white - box DES 
implementation for DRM applications . ” DRM 2002 and S . 
Chow , P . Eisen , H . Johnson , P . C . van Oorschot “ White - Box 
Cryptography and an AES Implementation ? ” SAC 2002 and 
the method described in A . Biryukov , C . Bouillaguet , D . 
Khovratovich : “ Cryptographic Schemes Based on the 
ASASA Structure : Black - Box , White - Box , and Public 
Key ” , ASIACRYPT 2014 ( referred to as Related Art 3 ) . 
5 . 1 . Difference from Related Art 1 [ 0103 ] Related Art 1 is a method for implementing algo 
rithms such as the existing AES and DES , but is not an 
encryption technique for a white box . It has already been 
demonstrated that Related Art 1 is not secure for the white 
box model . Accordingly , Related Art 1 is different from the 
technique according to the present embodiment , which 
greatly improves the security in the white box model . 
5 . 2 . Difference from Related Art 2 
[ 0104 ] Related Art 2 does not allow for free choice of an 
internal block cipher E ' , and the internal block cipher E ' is 
limited to the ASASA structure , which is decided in 
advance . The present embodiment demonstrates that even a 
block cipher , which is secure in the black box model , 
satisfies security , and it is possible to freely choose an 
internal block cipher E ' as long as the internal block cipher 
E ' satisfies the conditions ( conditions 1 and 2 ) of the input 
and output sizes . 
0105 ] This makes it possible to freely choose an internal 
block cipher E ' in the black box implementation in accor 
dance with implementation environments and the requested 
security . For example , when AES is used as an internal block 
cipher E ' and AES - NI is used , very speedy implementation 
by software is possible and secure implementation against a 
cash timing attack is possible . The use of light ciphers 
Piccolo and Pride by software makes implementation pos 
sible even in environments of considerable constraints such 
as a RAM size . Although the ASASA structure is not secure 
in the white box model , the method according to the present 
embodiment can ensure the security for the white box 
model . 
6 . Security Achieved by Encryption according to the Present 
Embodiment 
10106 FIG . 23 is a schematic diagram for describing the 
security achieved by the encryption according to the present 
embodiment , and illustrates an example in which the F 
function having a Feistel structure illustrated in FIG . 11 is 
configured by AES . As discussed above , an attacker can 
access an input and output of a table in the white box model . 
The problem that the key is obtained from the table having 
the same configuration as that of the black box model of the 
internal block cipher E ' ( white box model ) results in the 
same security level as that of the AES key recovery attack 
( black box model ) . The encryption according to the present 
embodiment thus makes it possible to preserve the same 
security level as that of the AES key recovery attack ( black 
box model ) . The security in the white box model results in 
the security of the key recovery problem in the black box 
model of the internal block cipher E ' . Unless an attacker 
knows the key , the attacker is incapable of reducing the table 
size ( Space - hardness ) . 
[ 0107 ] FIG . 24 is a schematic diagram for describing the 
security achieved by the encryption according to the present 
embodiment , and illustrates the amount of data that is 
necessary for an attacker to carry out an attack . The 
extremely large amount of data has to be obtained to acquire 
the secret key K for an attack . Specifically , 104 . 4 to 1010 . 5 
times as large the amount of data as that for a 128 - bit key is 
necessary . Even if an attacker obtains the data , the attacker 
is incapable of compressing the data . Massive data serve as 
a deterrent to illegal delivery . 
[ 0108 ] According to the present embodiment , it is possible 
to configure tables having a variety of sizes according to 
implementation requests . In the configurations of the spe 
cific examples ( B ) and ( C ) , it is possible to configure an 
algorithm having a given table size by changing the value of 
the number d of divided data . In the configurations of the 
specific examples ( D ) and ( E ) , it is possible to implement a 
plurality of table sizes for the same algorithm by appropri 
ately choosing the values of the number d of divided data or 
the sizes of an F function and an S function to be used . 
Furthermore , a user can freely choose an internal operation 
of a table , and choose the most appropriate internal opera 
tion for the black box implementation . 
7 . Example of Application to which the Present Embodiment 
is Applied 
[ 0109 ] The technique according to the present embodi 
ment can not only preserve the confidentiality of data 
through the communication channel as illustrated in FIG . 1 , 
but also be applied to a variety of applications . The follow 
ing describes some examples of the applications . 
[ 0110 ] FIG . 25 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
example applied to a copyright protection technique ( digital 
rights management ( DRM ) ) . As illustrated in FIG . 25 , a 
content server 400 on cloud computing conducts encryption , 
and content ( ciphertext C ) is delivered from the content 
server 400 to a user device 410 . The user device 410 is an 
electronic device such as a personal computer ( PC ) and a 
smartphone . The content ( ciphertext C ) is decrypted by the 
user device 410 . 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 Oct . 12 , 2017 
[ 0111 ] FIG . 26 is a schematic diagram illustrating FIG . 25 
in more detail . The content server 400 encrypts content such 
as a movie and music by use of a white box encryption 
function . The content server 400 has a license generator 402 
generate a license , and the license is transmitted to the user 
device 410 with the encrypted content . The user device 410 
has a license verifier 412 verify the transmitted license . If the 
license is successfully verified , the user device 410 decrypts 
the encrypted content by use of a white box decryption 
function . 
[ 0112 ] The copyright protection technique as illustrated in 
FIGS . 25 and 26 has to have the user device 410 decrypt 
content . In this case , if the key K were disclosed , content 
would be illegally delivered . In other words , the user device 
410 is not reliable in environments of insecure encryption . 
According to the present embodiment , the white box encryp 
tion technique can surely prevent a malicious user from 
acquiring the secret key K of content . 
[ 0113 ] FIG . 27 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
example applied to a payment system that uses NFC emu 
lation . As illustrated in FIG . 27 , a user device 430 is brought 
close to a NFC reader 420 for emulation in this system . The 
user device 430 includes a host CPU 432 , an NFC controller 
434 , and a secure element 436 . 
[ 0114 ] FIG . 28 is a schematic diagram illustrating FIG . 27 
in more detail . A server 440 on cloud computing includes 
credential information and payment information on a user . 
The user device 430 is an electronic device such as a mobile 
device , and performs encrypted communication with the 
server 440 to exchange the credential information . Mean 
while , the user device 430 performs encrypted communica 
tion with the NFC reader 420 to exchange the credential 
information . The white box encryption according to the 
present embodiment is used for the encrypted communica 
tion . Accordingly , the user device 430 includes a white box 
cipher function and a decryption function . Conducting 
encryption by use of the white box encryption can protect 
credential data on payment , and makes NFC emulation 
possible even if the user device 430 does not include the 
secure element 436 . 
[ 0115 ] FIG . 29 is a schematic diagram illustrating a 
scheme that is secure against even a memory leak . This 
system ensures the security even if memory leaks because of 
the vulnerability ( buffer overflow and Heartbleed ) of the 
software and malware . The security of a device 445 having 
vulnerability to malware and a memory leak is not dimin 
ished because of the characteristics of Space hardness of the 
white box encryption scheme unless data of several Kbytes , 
several Gbytes , or more leak . If the example of FIG . 29 
considers a code size as T , the security is not diminished 
unless data of T / 4 or more leak . Additionally , Space hard 
ness is a technique of ensuring the security of a cipher unless 
memory having a predetermined size or more leak . This 
method is effective especially when the amount of commu 
nication from the external network is limited from the 
internal network . 
[ 0116 ] FIG . 30 is a schematic diagram illustrating an 
example of encryption that is secure against a side - channel 
attack . The white box encryption scheme is typically dedi 
cated to software , but can also be used for hardware as a 
secure encryption scheme for a side channel through imple 
mentation by reconfigurable hardware ( FPGA ) . It is effec 
tive especially for a hardware device such as an IC card 450 
illustrated in FIG . 30 which may be undergo a side - channel 
attack . 
[ 0117 ] It should be understood by those skilled in the art 
that various modifications , combinations , sub - combinations 
and alterations may occur depending on design requirements 
and other factors insofar as they are within the scope of the 
appended claims or the equivalents thereof . 
10118 ] . In addition , the effects described in the present 
specification are merely illustrative and demonstrative , and 
not limitative . In other words , the technology according to 
the present disclosure can exhibit other effects that are 
evident to those skilled in the art along with or instead of the 
effects based on the present specification . [ 0119 ] Additionally , the present technology may also be 
configured as below . 
[ 0120 ] ( 1 ) An encryption device including : 
[ 0121 ] a data encryption unit configured to conduct 
encryption on the basis of a white box model in which 
at least a part of a plurality of round functions for 
sequentially conducting encryption processing on an 
input value is tabulated , and input and output values of 
the round function are recognizable from an outside , 
[ 0122 ] wherein the plurality of round functions each 
have an encryption function that is tabulated and 
encrypts an input value in a black box model in which 
input and output values are recognizable from the 
outside and an intermediate value is not recognizable 
from the outside . 
[ 0123 ] ( 2 ) The encryption device according to ( 1 ) , 
[ 0124 ] wherein a part of bits to be input into the round 
function is input into the encryption function , and 
[ 0125 ] the encryption function sets a part of bits input 
table into the encryption function as a fixed value , and 
disregards a part of output values of the encryption 
function , thereby outputting an output value having a 
number of bits corresponding to a difference between a 
number of the bits inputtable into the encryption func 
tion and a number of the bits input into the encryption 
function . 
[ 0126 ] ( 3 ) The encryption device according to ( 2 ) , 
[ 0127 ] wherein the round function operates an exclu 
sive OR of a bit that is not input into the encryption 
function among the bits to be input into the round 
function , and a bit of the output value from the encryp 
tion function . 
[ 0128 ] ( 4 ) The encryption device according to ( 3 ) , 
[ 0129 ] wherein the round function outputs a value of a 
bit input into the encryption function and a value of a 
bit obtained on the basis of the exclusive OR . 
[ 0130 ] ( 5 ) The encryption device according to ( 4 ) , 
[ 0131 ] wherein the round function outputs the value of 
the bit input into the encryption function as a lower bit 
than the value of the bit obtained on the basis of the 
exclusive OR . 
[ 0132 ] ( 6 ) The encryption device according to any one of 
( 2 ) to ( 5 ) , 
[ 0133 ] wherein an exclusive OR of an output of the 
round function and a predetermined value decided in 
advance is operated , and a resultant value is used as an 
input into a next round function or an output of the data 
encryption unit . 
US 2017 / 0294148 A1 Oct . 12 , 2017 
[ 0134 ] ( 7 ) The encryption device according to ( 1 ) , 
[ 0135 ] wherein one of the round functions has a plu 
rality of the encryption functions . 
[ 0136 ] ( 8 ) The encryption device according to any one of 
( 2 ) to ( 6 ) , 
[ 0137 ] wherein a round function in a more subsequent 
stage among the plurality of round functions has an 
input value of more bits input into the encryption 
function . 
[ 0138 ] ( 9 ) The encryption device according to ( 1 ) , 
( 0139 ] wherein one of the round functions has a plu 
rality of the encryption functions , 
[ 0140 ] bits to be input into the round function are 
divided and input into the plurality of encryption func 
tions , [ 0141 ] the plurality of encryption functions conduct 
non - linear operations , and 
10142 ] the round function conducts a linear transforma 
tion operation on a result of the non - linear operations 
by the plurality of encryption functions , and outputs the 
result . 
[ 0143 ] ( 10 ) The encryption device according to ( 9 ) , 
[ 0144 ] wherein a number of bits to be input into each of 
the plurality of encryption functions is equal to a 
number of bits to be output . 
[ 0145 ] ( 11 ) The encryption device according to ( 9 ) or ( 10 ) , 
[ 0146 ] wherein bits to be input into the plurality of 
encryption functions are different from each other in 
number . [ 0147 ] ( 12 ) The encryption device according to any one of 
( 1 ) to ( 11 ) , 
[ 0148 ] wherein the encryption function conducts 
encryption by using an extended key generated from a 
secret key corresponding to the data encryption unit . 
[ 0149 ] ( 13 ) An encryption method including : 
[ 0150 ] conducting encryption on the basis of a white 
box model in which at least a part of a plurality of round 
functions for sequentially conducting encryption pro 
cessing on an input value is tabulated , and input and 
output values of the round function are recognizable 
from an outside , 
[ 0151 ] wherein the plurality of round functions each 
encrypt an input value on the basis of an encryption 
function that is tabulated in a black box model in which 
input and output values are recognizable from the 
outside and an intermediate value is not recognizable 
from the outside . 
[ 0152 ] ( 14 ) A decryption device including : 
[ 0153 ] a data decryption unit configured to conduct 
decryption by an inverse operation of encryption pro 
cessing of conducting encryption on the basis of a 
white box model in which at least a part of a plurality 
of round functions for sequentially conducting encryp 
tion processing on an input value is tabulated , and input 
and output values of the round function are recogniz 
able from an outside , 
[ 0154 ] wherein the plurality of round functions each 
encrypt an input value on the basis of an encryption 
function that is tabulated in a black box model in which input and output values are recognizable from the 
outside and an intermediate value is not recognizable 
from the outside . 
[ 0155 ] ( 15 ) A decryption method including : [ 0156 ] conducting decryption by an inverse operation 
of encryption processing of conducting encryption on 
the basis of a white box model in which at least a part 
of a plurality of round functions for sequentially con 
ducting encryption processing on an input value is 
tabulated , and input and output values of the round 
function are recognizable from an outside , 
[ 0157 ] wherein the plurality of round functions each 
encrypt an input value on the basis of an encryption 
function that is tabulated in a black box model in which 
input and output values are recognizable from the 
outside and an intermediate value is not recognizable 
from the outside . 
What is claimed is : 
1 . An encryption device comprising : 
a data encryption unit configured to conduct encryption 
on the basis of a white box model in which at least a 
part of a plurality of round functions for sequentially 
conducting encryption processing on an input value is 
tabulated , and input and output values of the round 
function are recognizable from an outside , 
wherein the plurality of round functions each have an 
encryption function that is tabulated and encrypts an 
input value in a black box model in which input and 
output values are recognizable from the outside and an 
intermediate value is not recognizable from the outside . 
2 . The encryption device according to claim 1 , 
wherein a part of bits to be input into the round function 
is input into the encryption function , and 
the encryption function sets a part of bits inputtable into 
the encryption function as a fixed value , and disregards 
a part of output values of the encryption function , 
thereby outputting an output value having a number of 
bits corresponding to a difference between a number of 
the bits inputtable into the encryption function and a 
number of the bits input into the encryption function . 
3 . The encryption device according to claim 2 , 
wherein the round function operates an exclusive OR of 
a bit that is not input into the encryption function 
among the bits to be input into the round function , and 
a bit of the output value from the encryption function . 
4 . The encryption device according to claim 3 , 
wherein the round function outputs a value of a bit input 
into the encryption function and a value of a bit 
obtained on the basis of the exclusive OR 
5 . The encryption device according to claim 4 , 
wherein the round function outputs the value of the bit 
input into the encryption function as a lower bit than the 
value of the bit obtained on the basis of the exclusive 
OR . 
6 . The encryption device according to claim 1 , 
wherein an exclusive OR of an output of the round 
function and a predetermined value decided in advance 
is operated , and a resultant value is used as an input into 
a next round function or an output of the data encryp 
tion unit . 
7 . The encryption device according to claim 1 , 
wherein one of the round functions has a plurality of the 
encryption functions . 
8 . The encryption device according to claim 2 , 
wherein a round function in a more subsequent stage 
among the plurality of round functions has an input 
value of more bits input into the encryption function . 
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9 . The encryption device according to claim 1 , 
wherein one of the round functions has a plurality of the 
encryption functions , 
bits to be input into the round function are divided and input into the plurality of encryption functions , 
the plurality of encryption functions conduct non - linear 
operations , and 
the round function conducts a linear transformation opera 
tion on a result of 
the non - linear operations by the plurality of encryption 
functions , and outputs the result . 
10 . The encryption device according to claim 9 , 
wherein a number of bits to be input into each of the 
plurality of encryption functions is equal to a number of 
bits to be output . 
11 . The encryption device according to claim 9 , 
wherein bits to be input into the plurality of encryption 
functions are different from each other in number . 
12 . The encryption device according to claim 1 , 
wherein the encryption function conducts encryption by 
using an extended key generated from a secret key 
corresponding to the data encryption unit . 
13 . An encryption method comprising : 
conducting encryption on the basis of a white box model 
in which at least a part of a plurality of round functions 
for sequentially conducting encryption processing on 
an input value is tabulated , and input and output values 
of the round function are recognizable from an outside , 
wherein the plurality of round functions each encrypt an 
input value on the basis of an encryption function that 
is tabulated in a black box model in which input and 
output values are recognizable from the outside and an 
intermediate value is not recognizable from the outside . 
14 . A decryption device comprising : 
a data decryption unit configured to conduct decryption 
by an inverse operation of encryption processing of 
conducting encryption on the basis of a white box 
model in which at least a part of a plurality of round 
functions for sequentially conducting encryption pro 
cessing on an input value is tabulated , and input and 
output values of the round function are recognizable 
from an outside , 
wherein the plurality of round functions each encrypt an 
input value on the basis of an encryption function that 
is tabulated in a black box model in which input and 
output values are recognizable from the outside and an 
intermediate value is not recognizable from the outside . 
15 . A decryption method comprising : 
conducting decryption by an inverse operation of encryp 
tion processing of conducting encryption on the basis 
of a white box model in which at least a part of a 
plurality of round functions for sequentially conducting 
encryption processing on an input value is tabulated , 
and input and output values of the round function are 
recognizable from an outside , 
wherein the plurality of round functions each encrypt an 
input value on the basis of an encryption function that 
is tabulated in a black box model in which input and 
output values are recognizable from the outside and an 
intermediate value is not recognizable from the outside . 
* * * * * 
